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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/07/2011

Accident number: 772

Accident time: 12:50

Accident Date: 28/06/2005

Where it occurred: Not recorded, see
detailed map reference
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Sri Lanka
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Class: Demolition accident

Date of main report: 28/06/2005

ID original source: None

Name of source: Demining group

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Fuze

Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
demolition site
(explosives)
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: IIMASA

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: 024.05.72 E

Map north: 037.29.69 N

Map scale: Trincomallee

Map series: ABMP

Map edition: 01

Map sheet: 28

Map name: 1:50000

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
no independent investigation available (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is an IMSMA “tick-box”
record. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.
Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes
available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

IMSMA record extracts
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Place of accident: field [GPS recorded]
Cause of accident: “Without knowing the deminer was burning the device which caused the
detonation.”
Accident description:
“On the 28th of June 2005 [Demining group] QRT did a bulk demolition before going on
stand-down. Most of the ammunition went to high order but 3 grenades went to low order and
was destroyed by a second demolition.
After the team had located all metal scrap and rests from the destroyed ammunition by raking
the whole demolition area and checking inside the broken sandbags that was used as
protection during the demolition, they started to clean the area from the broken sandbags and
vegetation. The team started to burn all the collected sandbags and vegetation.
In one of the sandbags apparently one fuse was stuck after the demolition and was not
discovered by the deminers when they checked the area after non exploded devices. The
fuse probably went off by the heat from the fire and injured a deminer in his left arm and in his
back with small metal pieces.
The deminer was wearing his protective vest and visor but had his back turned towards the
fire when the fuse exploded.
Device: Fuze, unknown.
Victim wore Protective equipment.

Victim Report
Victim number: 958

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 34

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 30 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Arm; severe Back
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. Fragmentation injuries, presumed to
require surgical removal, so "severe".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Unavoidable because it is likely that the Victim
was working as directed, to approved SOPs, when the accident occurred. The secondary
cause is listed as Victim Inattention because it is possible that the Victim did not search
through the debris properly and so missed the fuze.
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When burning demolition debris that may include explosive devices, it is obvious that safety
distances should be maintained. With no report other than the notoriously inadequate IMSMA
form, it is not clear whether the demining group drew any conclusions from the accident. They
may have changed their working methods, which appear to have been questionable.
IMSMA accident records have always been over-simplified and entirely “Inadequate” for use
in determining causes and so deriving any useful lessons from the events. The UN supported
MAC in Sri Lanka has generally failed to conduct independent investigations and has failed
(despite requests) to make any available records available to the DDAS, so ignoring the
requirements of the IMAS. The Demining group involved in this accident is thanked for its
transparency in making their record available.
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